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12 CONFUSED MEN:
USING FLOWCHART VERDICT SHEETS TO
MITIGATE INCONSISTENT CIVIL VERDICTS
JERRY J. FANG†
ABSTRACT
The finality of jury verdicts reflects an implicit societal acceptance
of the soundness of the jury’s decision. Regardless, jurors are not
infallible, and the questions they are often tasked with deciding are
unfortunately neither obvious nor clear. The length of trial,
complexity of subject matter, volume of factual background, and
opaqueness of law can converge in a perfect storm that may confound
even the most capable juror. Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide decision rules to resolve inconsistent verdicts, the
current remedies authorized by Rule 49—notably, the resubmission of
the verdict to the jury and the ordering of a new trial—impose time
and money costs on the jury, litigants, and judicial system. The
increasing complexity of civil litigation raises the stakes by increasing
the likelihood of juror error and the costs of relitigating the case.
This Note proposes the creation of flowchart verdict sheets as a
prophylactic against juror confusion. The flowchart verdict sheet
builds upon current legal reform proposals to increase juror
understanding while decreasing juror confusion and incorporates
principles of effective visual design. By mitigating the confusion that
can result in inconsistencies before the verdict is rendered, the
flowchart verdict sheet enables the judicial system to avoid the costs
associated with remedying inconsistent verdicts.
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“Oh come on, nobody can know a thing like that. This isn’t an exact
1
science.”

INTRODUCTION
2

Imagine you are sitting on the jury for an excessive force trial.
The plaintiff has brought an excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and a state-law battery claim—among others—and seeks
monetary damages for injuries sustained at the hands of two New
York state correctional officers while he was held in a Suffolk County
3
courthouse cell awaiting an appearance on an outstanding warrant.
You learn that, without provocation, the correctional officers
punched the plaintiff in the face, struck the plaintiff’s head, slammed
4
the plaintiff on the floor, and kicked him in the lower back. You also
see photographs of the plaintiff’s injuries, depicting a swollen eye, a
5
broken nose, and multiple facial lacerations and contusions. Perhaps
you hear testimony about the hundreds of pages of medical records,
diagnoses, and bills stemming from the plaintiff’s medical treatment
6
after the incident. You might hear the plaintiff himself testify to how
he acquired a disability certificate for the resulting internal
derangement of his left knee or how he needed to visit a chiropractor
7
for the knee injury as well as for neck, lower-back, and nasal pain.
At the close of the trial, you may feel relatively confident about
the verdict you will reach. After all, you heard the judge’s instructions
on the legal elements of an excessive force claim under § 1983 and on

1. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
2. The substantive facts for this illustration are drawn from Anderson v. County of
Suffolk, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 6, 2009). The inferences drawn from this case are
rhetorical and not intended as true representations of the jurors’ actual thoughts or what they
may have seen at trial.
3. First Amended Complaint at 1, 6–7, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
2011), ECF No. 15.
4. Id. at 1, 7.
5. Plaintiff’s Exhibits at 2a–2q, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013), ECF
No. 62-1.
6. Plaintiff’s Exhibits at 3–5, 8, 10–11, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2013), ECF Nos. 62, 62-2, 62-3, 62-4.
7. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013), ECF No.
62-2 (presenting medical records demonstrating the plaintiff’s injuries). In the actual case, the
plaintiff Perrim Anderson incurred bills in excess of $8000 for chiropractic treatment alone, in
addition to other costs for further treatment of his injuries. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 at 9, 13,
Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009), ECF No. 62-3.

FANG IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/21/2014 6:07 PM

USING FLOWCHART VERDICT SHEETS

289

8

the applicable New York state law for battery. The verdict sheet also
directs you to determine the amount of damages if you find either
officer individually liable on either the excessive force or battery
9
claim. As you deliberate, you send a note to the judge requesting
some of the exhibits shown at trial, including the photographs of the
10
plaintiff’s injuries. Three days later, you inform the judge that you
have reached a verdict—you have found only one of the officers
liable on both the excessive force claim and the battery claim and
11
have awarded the plaintiff $65,000 in damages.
The plaintiff’s lawyer raises a potential inconsistency in the
verdict, noting the ambiguity in whether you and your fellow jurors
based the damages upon the excessive force claim or the battery
12
claim. Consequently, the judge sends you back into the jury room to
13
clarify your verdict. You inform the judge that the damages pertain
only to the excessive force claim and return to the jury room for
14
further deliberations. At this point, you might not understand what
exactly the judge is looking for—you certainly agree with your fellow
jurors that one of the defendant correctional officers violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using excessive force. But you are
not sure if you are still allowed to find that the defendants also
battered the plaintiff or if doing so would lead you back to the same
15
ambiguity that you were requested to clarify. At the same time,
finding that the defendants did not batter the plaintiff makes you
uneasy, and the graphic photographs of the plaintiff’s injuries sitting
16
before you in the jury room do you no favors. You send another
8. Under Second Circuit precedent, to establish an excessive force claim under § 1983, “‘a
plaintiff must show that the force used by the officer was, in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting [the officer], “objectively unreasonable” under Fourth Amendment standards.’”
Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d
817, 823 (2d Cir. 1990)). As for the state law battery claim, New York state law requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant “intentionally touch[ed] [the plaintiff], without [the
plaintiff]’s consent, and cause[d] an offensive bodily contact.” N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR.—
CIVIL 3:3 (Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions Ass’n of Supreme Court Justices 2013).
9. Order at 2–3, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2013), ECF No. 89.
10. Court Exhibit 1, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013), ECF No. 82.
11. Order, supra note 9, at 2–3.
12. Id. at 3. The jury’s confusion may in part be explained by the language in the verdict
sheet, which asked the jury to determine the amount of compensatory damages if it found the
defendants “liable on the Section 1983 and/or battery claim.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 3–4.
15. See supra notes 12–13.
16. Plaintiff’s Exhibits, supra note 5, at 2a–2q.
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note to the judge, asking if the answers you have changed on the
17
verdict sheet “fall in line with [the judge’s] request to reconsider.”
Thereafter, you return a second verdict. Although you again find the
same officer liable on the excessive force claim and assign the same
damages, you now find the officer not liable on the battery claim—
18
thereby creating an inconsistent verdict.
In cases involving inconsistencies between a general verdict and
19
a jury’s answers to special interrogatories, a court generally has
three options: it may enter judgment based on the answers to the
special interrogatories, resubmit the verdict to the jury for further
20
consideration, or order a new trial. In Anderson v. County of
21
Suffolk, the court sought to remedy the potential ambiguity in the
first verdict by asking the jury to clarify whether the damages
22
pertained to the excessive force claim or to the battery claim.
Although the jury addressed the original ambiguity by changing its
answer for the battery claim, it inadvertently created an inconsistency
within the special interrogatories by “explicitly finding [the
defendant] liable on the Section 1983 claim based upon excessive
force and awarding damages accordingly, but finding [the defendant]
23
not liable on a battery claim.” The court acknowledged that it was
impossible to harmonize the jury’s answers, reasoning that although
the jury could theoretically find that the defendant’s alleged “actions
such as punching Plaintiff and throwing him to the ground . . .
constituted a battery but did not rise to the level of a [§ 1983]

17. Order, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting Court Exhibit 6, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013), ECF No. 82).
18. Id. at 4–5 (quoting Court Exhibit 8, Anderson, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2013), ECF No. 82). In short, the inconsistency arises because the excessive force claim
essentially presupposes that some force has been applied, which would necessitate finding that a
battery has occurred. See supra note 8.
19. Although Anderson may also be fairly seen as a case in which the jury was asked to
render a general verdict for battery and another general verdict for excessive force, see infra
note 90, the court analyzed the validity of the verdict under the framework for general verdicts
with special interrogatories, Order, supra note 9, at 6–8.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3).
21. Anderson v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 6, 2009).
22. Order, supra note 9, at 6. Because the court found the jury’s answers to the special
interrogatories “consistent with one another but arguably inconsistent with the general verdict,”
it proceeded under Rule 49(b)(3). Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the legal landscape
concerning inconsistent verdicts, see infra Part I.
23. Order, supra note 9, at 7.
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constitutional deprivation, the converse is not also true.” Citing the
inconsistent verdict as evidence of the jury’s confusion, the court
declined to resubmit the verdict to the jury for further consideration
25
and instead deemed a new trial necessary.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) authorize
26
an array of remedies for inconsistent jury verdicts. Although a judge,
when confronted with an inconsistent verdict, has discretion under
Rule 49 to either resubmit the verdict to the jury for further
27
deliberation or order a new trial, these ex post remedies can be
28
expensive for all parties in terms of both time and money. New
trials, in particular, can be financially burdensome for the judicial
29
system given the monetary costs of trying a case —costs which are
30
ultimately borne by taxpayers and society as a whole. Trials also
31
impose time and money costs on the litigants, which may be

24. Id. at 8. Although the jury’s misunderstanding of the relationship between the battery
and excessive force claims presumably can be resolved by either a visual or textual verdict sheet,
this Note argues that visual formats explain context and relationships among legal claims and
among elements within a claim more clearly. See infra Part III.B.3.
25. Order, supra note 9, at 7–9.
26. For a more detailed discussion on the court’s choices when confronted with an
inconsistent verdict, see infra Part I.A.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3).
28. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that retrials can be “laborious and expensive”).
29. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308 n.1 (1985) (noting
that the average cost of a jury trial in federal court in 1982 ranged from $5843 to $12,035);
Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 392–93 (1986) (“A recent
study found that the average out-of-pocket cost to the federal government of certain tort cases
tried by jury is $15,028 . . . .”). For a comprehensive study on the costs of civil disputes on the
civil justice system and on society, see generally JAMES S. KAKALIK & ABBY EISENSHTAT
ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2888.pdf.
30. See Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 191, 208–09 (2005) (discussing the costs for taxpayers of summoning jurors, protecting
jurors, instructing jurors, and paying juror fees).
31. See Samsung’s Request for Thirty Minutes to Review the Jury Verdict Form Before the
Jury is Dismissed For the Purpose of Seeking Clarification of Potential Inconsistent Verdict if
Necessary at 2, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (No. 11-cv-1846) (N.D.
Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Samsung’s Request] (noting that the litigants “ha[d] expended
substantial time, money, and resources to bring this case to verdict”). In addition, litigants may
need to pay miscellaneous fees for filing extra documents. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DISTRICT COURT MISCELLANEOUS FEE SCHEDULE (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Fees/DistrictCourtMiscellaneousFeeSchedule.aspx
(detailing various federal filing fees). And of course, litigants might also be responsible for
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especially significant if the case involves expert witnesses or
32
voluminous discovery, or for litigation involving highly complex
33
subject matter. Costs may be further shouldered by jurors, who are
forced to forgo their “time, wages, and productivity” while
34
participating in the trial. Even if the judge avoids ordering a new
trial, there may also be costs associated with resubmitting inconsistent
verdicts to juries for further deliberation. For example, in addition to
time costs on the judicial system, federal courts must pay jury fees for
35
empaneling the jury for an extra day, along with potential
36
37
transportation costs and subsistence allowances. And of course,
jurors still bear the costs of lost time, wages, and productivity while
38
re-deliberating.
Certainly, inconsistent jury verdicts are not inherently
problematic. As discussed above, both the Federal Rules and case law
provide judges with multiple options when confronted with
inconsistent jury verdicts, including the option of ordering of a new
trial as a backstop. If reaching the “right” answer is the only concern,
then asking a jury to reconsider its verdict or ordering a new trial
does not seem especially unpalatable. Rather, this Note posits that it
is the consequences of the very actions meant to remedy inconsistent
verdicts—time and money expenses—that are the problems
presented by inconsistent jury verdicts. But what if one could avoid
the costs associated with these ex post remedies by preventing juror
confusion ex ante?

attorneys’ fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)
(noting that prevailing parties are not generally entitled to attorneys’ fees from the losing
party).
32. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010). The authors found median litigation costs to be
$15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants in cases involving discovery. Id. Other
commentators have also recognized the sizeable costs that discovery can impose. See Brister,
supra note 30, at 209 (“Given the broad scope of civil discovery, pretrial costs normally far
exceed those incurred at trial . . . .”).
33. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1502 (2001) (“[T]he median cost of patent litigation to each side is $799,000 through the end of
discovery, and $1,503,000 through trial and appeal.”).
34. Brister, supra note 30, at 209.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b)(1) (2012). The statute establishes the juror attendance fee at $40
per juror per day. Id.
36. Id. § 1871(c).
37. Id. § 1871(d).
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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This Note expands on the current academic literature on jury
reform and proposes the use of flowcharts in verdict sheets to
minimize the risk of inconsistent jury verdicts caused by jury
confusion. These “flowchart verdict sheets” can visually—and in a
clear and intuitive manner—“map” the cognitive decisions a jury
must make to reach a verdict. The flowchart verdict sheet thus aims to
reduce juror confusion through several means: by unlocking the
visual-reasoning abilities of jurors, by increasing juror comprehension
and decisionmaking, and by presenting the valid decision paths
leading to specific outcomes. In doing so, the flowcharts are not
meant to function as a remedy that repairs inconsistent results, but as
a prophylactic that enables juries to get to the “right” result the first
time. Finally, this Note proposes as an introductory step toward
implementation the creation of pattern flowchart verdict sheets for
certain types of legal claims that a court is likely to encounter.
Both courts and academic scholars are aware of the problem of
inconsistent jury verdicts and the current remedies available to
address them. Rule 49 of the Federal Rules authorizes certain
39
remedies for inconsistent verdicts, but as Part I explains, these ex
post remedies can be expensive and time consuming. Rather, given
the wide discretion over the implementation of the verdict that Rule
49 vests in the trial judge, Part II argues that judges should consider
using flowchart verdict sheets to prevent the juror confusion that can
cause inconsistent verdicts. As Part III demonstrates, extensive
academic literature supports the use of visuals and simple language to
assist jurors in comprehension and decisionmaking. The flowchart
verdict sheet also increases clarity and unlocks the jury’s visualreasoning abilities by applying Professor Edward Tufte’s principles of
effective visual design, as discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V
speculates that despite Rule 49’s permissive language concerning jury
verdict sheets, flowchart verdict sheets—and other visual formats of
verdict sheets—are not widely implemented in part because the costs
of implementation may outweigh the benefits or because of judicial
resistance to change. As Part V submits, however, creating pattern
flowchart verdict sheets that incorporate the principles described in
Parts III and IV can not only minimize the fear of appellate reversal
underlying the hesitancy to implement the verdict sheets, but also
represent a viable first step toward tackling the financial
consequences of inconsistent jury verdicts.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ON INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICTS
Since the colonial era, the use of juries has been an entrenched
40
and perhaps essential part of the American legal system. Even in
modern times, civil trials have accounted for half of the ten thousand
41
federal jury trials each year. The jury’s verdict has also been
42
regarded as virtually untouchable, with the jury’s mental processes
43
and reasoning shielded from the eyes of the public and the court.
Courts in both criminal and civil cases have upheld the deference that
44
should be given to the jury’s decisions and decisionmaking process.
Indeed, the policy reasons behind protecting the sanctity of jury
45
verdicts are important; juries, however, are far from infallible in
their decisionmaking. Although juries are generally presumed to
46
follow the court’s instructions, situations in which a jury mistakenly
misunderstands the law or intentionally disregards the judge’s
instructions may result in a verdict inconsistent with the facts or the
47
applicable law.
Two preliminary factors should be considered. First, the
distinction between inconsistencies caused by unintentional
misunderstanding and those caused by intentional disregard is
important—the proposed flowchart verdict sheets are meant
primarily to address inconsistent jury verdicts that result from jury
confusion, lack of comprehension, or faulty decisionmaking as
opposed to erroneous verdicts caused by intentional nullification,

40. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288
(1999). For a more in-depth discussion on the historical underpinnings and development of the
American jury, see id. at 287–89. This Note will focus on federal civil jury trials. As some legal
scholars have suggested, courts may view procedural departures—such as unconventional
verdict sheets—with more suspicion in criminal trials. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
41. Id. at 289.
42. Although, for example, judgments notwithstanding the verdict allow judges to override
a jury verdict, some scholars posit that those are infrequently used. See infra note 233 and
accompanying text.
43. Landsman, supra note 40, at 304.
44. E.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 118–19 (1987); Mid-West Underground
Storage, Inc. v. Porter, 717 F.2d 493, 501 (10th Cir. 1983).
45. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 119–20 (recognizing the need to protect the finality and
legitimacy of verdicts and to insulate the jury from harassment).
46. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981); Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692,
702 (7th Cir. 2007).
47. For an extended discussion on the role of jury nullification in civil trials and reasons
why juries may disregard the law, see generally Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1601 (2001).
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Flowcharts
deliberate misconduct, or extraneous influences.
promoting clarity and comprehension would not stop a jury intent on
49
disregarding a judge’s instructions. Second, the form of verdict
submitted—whether it is a traditional general verdict, a special
verdict, or a general verdict with interrogatories—may be relevant to
the likelihood of inconsistencies in the verdict, which in turn may
50
determine the applicability of the flowchart verdict sheets.
A. The Framework of Rule 49
Rule 49 of the Federal Rules specifies the verdicts that a jury
may return based on the form of verdict that the court submits to the
jury. It also outlines the basic parameters for each form of verdict and
delineates what the court has discretion to do for each kind of
51
verdict. Rule 49, however, does not cover traditional general
verdicts, in which the jury need only “announce which party wins,
52
and, if it is plaintiff, the amount that should be recovered.” This
Section examines special verdicts and general verdicts with
interrogatories, as provided for by Rules 49(a) and 49(b). As will be
seen, many courts have contributed to the case law interpreting the
Rule 49 framework and applying the currently available remedies for
inconsistent verdicts, which include resubmission of the
interrogatories to the jury and the ordering of a new trial.
1. Special Verdicts. Rule 49(a) grants the trial court discretion to
require the jury to return a special verdict, in which the jury answers
only written interrogatories of fact but does not enter a general
53
verdict declaring which party prevails. Rather, the judge is the one
who applies the applicable legal standard to the jury’s factual

48. See id. at 1604 (drawing the distinction between jury nullification and “instances where
a jury may have misunderstood the facts or the law”).
49. But cf. id. at 1633 (suggesting that special verdicts and interrogatories may decrease the
likelihood of a jury intentionally disregarding the judge’s instructions).
50. See infra Part II.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
52. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN
HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1108 (10th ed. 2009).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)(1); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 1109; see Selgas v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.P.R. 1994), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub
nom. Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The parties agree that the
initial jury verdict form consisted of a special verdict, because it asked the jury for findings of
fact without requesting a general finding for one of the parties. Therefore, the analysis should
begin with [Rule 49(a)].”).
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54

findings. Although Rule 49(a) does not have explicit language
referring to inconsistencies in the answers to the interrogatories,
courts have recognized that “it is clear that in order for a verdict
55
[under Rule 49(a)] to stand the answers must be consistent . . . .”
And although it follows that Rule 49(a) would thus remain silent on
the appropriate remedies for any inconsistent factual findings by the
jury, the Supreme Court has indicated that the trial court has a duty
56
to harmonize inconsistent answers to the interrogatories. In
addition, courts have held that judges have discretion to submit
57
additional interrogatories to the jury, to make missing factual
58
findings, and finally, to order a new trial if the inconsistency cannot
59
be adequately reconciled by the court.
2. General Verdicts With Special Interrogatories. In contrast to
Rule 49(a), Rule 49(b) allows the court to submit a general verdict to
60
the jury in addition to the written interrogatories of fact. A jury must
both “render [the] general verdict and answer the questions in
61
writing” under this section. The court is then given discretion to
pursue different actions based on whether and to what extent the
jury’s verdict is consistent with the answers to the special
62
interrogatories.
If the jury’s verdict is consistent with the answers, the court’s
only option is to enter judgment under Rule 58 on the verdict and
63
answers. If, however, courts are confronted with inconsistent jury

54. Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002); see Guidry v. Kem Mfg.
Co., 598 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the usefulness of a Rule 49(a) verdict in
allowing a jury to focus on the facts without the risk of confusion as to which legal standard to
apply to the facts).
55. Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963).
57. Morrison, 546 F.2d at 160–61. The court reasoned that in that specific instance, “[i]t
would be anomalous to hold that, while a court pursuant to 49(a) must search for a view of the
case that will make the jury’s answers consistent, it may not submit an additional interrogatory
to the jury to clarify an ambiguity.” Id. at 161. The court did leave open the question of whether
every case involving inconsistent answers permitted a judge to submit supplementary
interrogatories. Id. However, at least one other court has submitted supplementary
interrogatories to clarify an ambiguity. Selgas, 858 F. Supp. at 319.
58. Blackwell v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 532 F.2d 1006, 1008 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
59. Bonin v. Tour W., Inc. 896 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1990).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(1).
61. Id.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(2).
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verdicts, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) of Rule 49 provide guidance
64
to judges. If the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories are
internally consistent but at least one answer is inconsistent with the
general verdict, Rule 49(b)(3) gives the court three choices: first, it
can “approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment
65
according to the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict;”
second, it can “direct the jury to further consider its answers and
66
67
verdict;” and third, it can “order a new trial.” The court’s discretion
as to these choices must, however, be exercised in light of the
68
circumstances creating the inconsistency. The only limitation on the
trial court’s discretion is that the judge may not enter judgment based
69
on the verdict if it is inconsistent with the interrogatories. However,
as with Rule 49(a), courts have held that the trial judge must first
attempt to harmonize the verdict with the special interrogatories
before considering the three options provided by Rule 49(b)(3) and
should only resort to those options if it is not reasonably possible to
“resolve the apparent inconsistency between the answers and the
70
verdict.”
Lastly, if the answers are internally inconsistent and at least one
is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court must choose
between resubmitting the verdict to the jury for further deliberation
and ordering a new trial—it may not enter judgment on either the
71
verdict or the interrogatories. As with Rule 49(b)(3), courts have
held that under Rule 49(b)(4), the trial judge has a duty to attempt to
harmonize inconsistent answers “if it is possible under a fair reading

64. See Jonielunas v. City of Worchester Police Dep’t, 338 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D. Mass.
2004) (recognizing that the court is not obligated to disregard an inconsistent jury verdict as a
matter of form).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3)(A); Nimnicht v. Dick Evans, Inc., 477 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir.
1973).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3)(B).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3)(C).
68. In Phillips Chemical Co. v. Hulbert, 301 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir. 1962), the Fifth Circuit
determined that it would be improper to resubmit the verdict form to the jury for consideration
when the jury had already proved incapable of resolving the inconsistency. Id.
69. Blackwell v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 532 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
70. Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.P.R. 1994), aff’d in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting
Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1993)) (quotation marks omitted); Kirkendoll v.
Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1967) (quoting Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372
U.S. 108, 119 (1963)).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(4).
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72

of them[.]” In other words, if the jury’s answers to special
interrogatories can be read consistently, “they must be resolved that
73
way.”
B. The Broad Discretion of the Trial Courts
Rule 49 contains permissive language that leaves the form of
74
verdict to the trial judge’s discretion. It may be possible to even infer
that the trial judge’s discretion in forming verdicts under Rule 49
arises out of a desire to limit the possibility of inconsistencies in the
75
verdict. As a threshold matter, the court has a duty to ensure that
76
the jury returns a verdict “capable of supporting a judgment.” For
example, ambiguous or unclear verdicts would be “insufficient to
77
support a judgment.” Likewise, incomplete verdicts or verdicts that
otherwise leave the disposition of certain issues to the jury’s inference
78
do not meet this standard. Rule 49, however, grants the trial judge
not only complete discretion over whether to use a special verdict or a
general verdict with written interrogatories as opposed to a
traditional general verdict in the first place, but also considerable
79
latitude in determining how to implement the interrogatories. As
one commentator notes, “it is remarkable how little help [Rule 49]
gives a judge in determining when and how to use a special verdict or
80
a general verdict with interrogatories.” Federal appellate courts

72. Cf. Jonielunas v. City of Worchester Police Dep’t, 338 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D. Mass.
2004) (stating the general proposition that “it is the duty of the courts to attempt to harmonize
the answers” to interrogatories (quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 119) (quotation mark omitted)).
73. Id. (quoting Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364
(1962)) (quotation marks omitted); see L.A. Nut House v. Holiday Hardware Corp., 825 F.2d
1351, 1353–54 (9th Cir. 1987) (indicating that a verdict must be upheld unless it is impossible to
harmonize the answers under a fair reading).
74. Selgas, 858 F. Supp. at 320; see In re CLDC Mgmt. Corp., 72 F.3d 1347, 1353 (7th Cir.
1996) (“A trial court has wide discretion in submitting special verdicts to the jury in order to
facilitate its comprehension of the issues.”); Robert Dudnik, Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 483 (1965).
75. See Guidry v. Kem Mfg. Co., 598 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1979) (“It is critical, however,
that the structure of the questions and proposed answers avoid the possibility that the answers
will be conflicting.”).
76. Cheney v. Moler, 285 F.2d 116, 118–19 (10th Cir. 1960).
77. Hartnett v. Brown & Bigelow, 394 F.2d 438, 441 n.2 (10th Cir. 1968).
78. Id. at 441–42. The court reasoned that “these issues should be submitted in simple
language with a proper form of verdict” and that they “[were] too important to be left in a
nebulous condition.” Id. at 442.
79. Dudnik, supra note 74, at 483–84.
80. Id. at 484.
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have also uniformly held that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in the
style, format, substance, and language of the interrogatories under
81
82
both Rules 49(a) and 49(b), as long as the law is accurately stated.
Thus, the explicit language in the rule itself, the policies behind the
rule, and the decisions applying the rule all point to the considerable
latitude the trial judge has to determine and mold various aspects of
83
the verdict sheet to suit the needs of the case.
II. THE FLOWCHART VERDICT SHEET
The flowchart verdict sheet is meant to be clear, simple, and
84
intuitive. At its core, these verdict sheets minimize the risk of
inconsistent verdicts by mapping out for the jury all possible decision
outcomes for the elements of a claim or among multiple claims. The
basic structure of the flowchart verdict sheet begins with the premise
that trials generally have two outcomes—either the plaintiff prevails
or the defendant prevails. Following from this premise, the verdict
sheet visually displays the different paths that lead to the two
outcomes based on the jury’s decisions. If an affirmative defense
applies, the elements of the claim that the plaintiff needs to prove
85
might be vertically positioned on one side, with the elements of an
affirmative defense vertically positioned on the opposite side. Based
on how the jurors answer a certain question, they might be directed
by arrows to the next decision point, whether it is to the next element,

81. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 159 (2d Cir. 2012); Romano v. Howarth, 998
F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1993); Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 273 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 690 (11th Cir. 1984);
Dreiling v. Gen. Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1975); Perzinski v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
503 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1974); Abernathy v. S. Pac. Co., 426 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1970);
Tenn. Consol. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 416 F.2d 1192, 1200 (6th Cir. 1969)
(citing Erwin v. Keck, 351 F.2d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 1965)); R.H. Baker & Co. v. Smith-Blair, Inc.,
331 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1964).
82. McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996).
83. That the drafters of Rule 49 failed to provide any standards or guidance as to who
would draft the special interrogatories and what form they should take, Dudnik, supra note 74,
at 483–84, lends credence to the notion that trial judges were meant to have discretion with
regard to verdicts.
84. See EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION 177
(2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY] (“Graphical elegance is often found in
simplicity of design and complexity of data.”); cf. EDWARD R. TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS
9 (1997) [hereinafter TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS] (“Many of our examples suggest that
clarity and excellence in thinking is very much like clarity and excellence in the display of
data.”).
85. See infra Figure 1.
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Recall that even though the Rule 49 framework incorporates
87
discretionary remedies for inconsistencies in verdicts under 49(b),
these remedies inevitably impose time and money costs on the
88
judicial system, litigants, and taxpayers. The flowchart verdict sheet
avoids, or at least mitigates, these costs by minimizing the juror
confusion, miscomprehension, or faulty decisionmaking that can
result in inconsistent verdicts. Thus, they are intended to apply
primarily to two scenarios: first, to the general verdicts with special
89
interrogatories governed by Rule 49(b), and second, to cases like
Anderson v. County of Suffolk in which the jury is required to render
90
a verdict on multiple claims.
The first rationale behind a limited application of flowchart
verdict sheets is logistical. Because the use of flowcharts in verdict
sheets has been largely absent not only in practice but also in the
91
relevant academic literature, implementation should be limited first
to a narrower subset of cases so that problems that emerge can be
adequately identified and resolved. Initially restricting the use of
flowchart verdict sheets to civil cases can also reduce the risk of a
92
court overturning the verdict sheet on appeal. Furthermore, the
scope should be narrowed initially to cases in federal court to avoid
issues that may arise from any variations in state civil procedure rules.
Second, limiting the scope of applicability also makes sense
substantively because the two scenarios that flowchart verdict sheets
are meant to address are scenarios in which inconsistencies seem to
be the most prevalent. For general verdicts with special
interrogatories under Rule 49(b), this should seem fairly
straightforward—the degree of consistency between the verdict and

87. See supra Part I.B.
88. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text.
89. See supra Part I.A.2.
90. Although the same case may arguably be viewed as either the jury entering one general
verdict involving multiple claims or as the jury entering one general verdict for each claim, this
distinction seems to be purely semantic. Cf. Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 63 n.1
(1st Cir. 2002) (noting that a general verdict sheet with two interrogatories asking the jury to
determine whether the plaintiff had proved a negligence claim and her product liability claim
could also “be described as two general verdicts”). In any case, the choice of label does not
significantly affect the application of the flowchart verdict sheet.
91. See infra Part III.B.3.
92. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 121
(1990) (reprinted in 132 F.R.D. 575 (1991)) (suggesting that efforts to improve jury
comprehension “must be approached with greater caution in criminal cases, for any departure
from the norm provides grounds for appeal”).
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written interrogatories is the sole determinant of the actions the trial
93
judge may take. It would not be out of the question for a jury to
return inconsistent interrogatories, regardless of whether the
interrogatories ask the jury to make multiple findings of fact or to
determine whether the multiple elements of a certain claim have been
met. In the second scenario involving Anderson-type cases,
inconsistencies in a jury’s verdict may also arise when the jury must
resolve the ultimate issue of liability on multiple claims. Again, it
would not be hard to imagine a scenario in which a jury finds liability
94
on an excessive force claim but not on a battery claim, or a scenario
in which a jury simultaneously decides that a plaintiff has prevailed
on its claims and that the defendant has also carried its burden on
95
contradictory counterclaims.
Conversely, the traditional general verdict and factual
interrogatories submitted under a Rule 49(a) special verdict seem to
pose a lesser risk of inconsistency, at least in theory. The traditional
general verdict sheet creates virtually zero risk for an inconsistent
verdict resulting from jury confusion because it requires the jury to
96
determine the sole question of which party prevails. It is conceivable
that a jury returning a general verdict might find that a plaintiff
97
prevails and fail to assign damages, or for a jury to find that the
98
defendant prevails and yet award damages to the plaintiff anyway.

93. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
94. Anderson v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 2:09-cv-1913 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 6, 2009); see supra
notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
95. ABM Marking, Inc. v. Zanasi Fratelli, S.R.L., 353 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2003).
According to the court, the inconsistency arose when the jury found both that the plaintiff
“substantially performed all obligations required of it under the contract” and—for the
counterclaim—that the plaintiff had breached the contract. Id. (quoting ABM Marking, Inc. v.
Zanasi Fratelli, S.R.L., No. 97-cv-0863, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2000)) (quotation marks
omitted).
96. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
97. See Jones v. SouthPeak Interactive Corp., No. 3:12-cv-443, 2013 WL 5837756, at *8
(E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2013) (recognizing that cases in which the jury “finds liability but nonetheless
awards zero damages,” although not common, are also “not a rarity either” (quoting Zhang v.
Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003))).
98. For example, a jury may find that a defendant should prevail because the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent but award the plaintiff damages anyway out of sympathy. In Barnett v.
Love, 294 F.2d 585 (4th Cir. 1961), after a head-on automobile collision, the plaintiff charged
the defendant with negligence, to which the defendant counterclaimed, alleging negligence on
the plaintiff’s part. Id. at 586. Even though the jury foreman indicated to the trial court that the
evidence seemed to be insufficient to find either party negligent, he also admitted that the jury
was “very much in sympathy with the plaintiff” due to the severity of his injury. Id. at 586 n.1,
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Nonetheless, the above situations seem to be more the result of
intentional jury nullification than inconsistencies created by juror
99
confusion. In any case, the underlying intent may be irrelevant
because the jury’s reasoning as to a general verdict would be
100
shielded.
Special verdicts submitted to the jury under Rule 49(a) may also
pose a minimal risk of inconsistency in the verdict because the jury is
constrained solely to making findings of fact whereas the trial judge is
101
the one who applies the law to the jury’s factual findings. This idea
is bolstered by the absence of explicit language in Rule 49(a)
pertaining to inconsistencies and how they should be resolved, in
102
stark contrast to Rule 49(b). In addition, even if inconsistencies
arise in the jury’s factual findings under Rule 49(a), the trial court
seems to have greater flexibility and latitude to engage in an ad hoc
judicial resolution of the inconsistent findings without being
mandated by the Federal Rules to impose the time-consuming and
103
costly remedies of resubmission to the jury or ordering a new trial.
Nonetheless, even if flowchart verdict sheets may be more
effective in addressing inconsistencies in cases involving multiple
claims or Rule 49(b) verdicts, they should not necessarily be
discounted in situations involving a traditional one-claim general
verdict or a special verdict under Rule 49(a). For instance, the same
rationales underlying the usefulness of these proposed verdict sheets
in mitigating inconsistencies for general verdicts submitted with
written interrogatories under Rule 49(b) may still apply to special
verdicts under Rule 49(a). Indeed, some courts have exhibited
confusion between verdicts under Rules 49(a) and Rule 49(b) that
104
may underscore the structural similarities between the two. In

587. The jury ended up assigning compensatory as well as punitive damages in favor of the
plaintiff. Id. at 587.
99. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
103. See Blackwell v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 532 F.2d 1006, 1008 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (observing that under Rule 49(a), when faced with inconsistent factual findings by the
jury, the court not only is allowed to make any missing factual findings, but also is presumed to
“have made whatever findings are necessary to support the judgment that he enters”).
104. See Samuel M. Driver, A More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 9 F.R.D. 495, 495
(1950) (noting that “the cases reveal a surprising amount of confusion regarding [subdivisions
49(a) and 49(b)]”).
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105

Babcock v. General Motors Corp., the First Circuit reasoned that a
verdict sheet titled as “Special Verdict Form” was not a true special
verdict under Rule 49(a), but rather, a verdict under 49(b) because it
required the jury to “answer[] specific interrogatories designed to
channel its deliberation . . . in order to decide which party should
106
prevail.” As another example, the Fifth Circuit in Dreiling v.
107
General Electric Co. alluded that special interrogatories were
108
submitted to the jury under Rule 49(a) —and yet in a footnote,
implied that the jury seemed to be deciding the case “according
109
to . . . principles of law,” referencing a Rule 49(b) verdict. Thus, the
confusion between Rules 49(a) and Rule 49(b) verdicts seems to
indicate that they are not wholly dissimilar. Rather, verdicts under
Rule 49(b) can be fairly seen as Rule 49(a) special verdicts that also
require the jury to determine the ultimate issue of which party
110
prevails. In any case, flowchart verdict sheets may assist juries in
making internally consistent findings of fact.
As for traditional general verdicts, the principles underlying the
flowchart verdict sheet may still be applicable in those situations in
which the jury must decide only the issue of which party prevails,
even if the verdict sheet itself does not use a flowchart. Although the
likelihood of an inconsistent verdict is intuitively nonexistent, jurors
111
may still be confused about the underlying law, potentially resulting
in a “consistent” but incorrect verdict. In this situation, a jury might
use a flowchart detailing the elements of a claim as nothing more than
112
a resource while deliberating. Thus, flowchart verdict sheets may

105. Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 63.
107. Dreiling v. Gen. Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. Id. at 773.
109. Id. at 774 n.7.
110. Courts have repeatedly implied that written interrogatories under Rules 49(a) and
49(b) should be treated similarly. For example, some lower courts have quoted language from
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963)—a Supreme Court case
concerning a verdict under Rule 49(a)—in declaring that it is the trial judge’s duty to harmonize
inconsistent interrogatories under Rule 49(b). See, e.g., Kirkendoll v. Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694,
699 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to attempt to harmonize the answers, if it is
possible under a fair reading of them: ‘Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s
answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.’” (quoting Gallick,
372 U.S. at 119)); Jonielunas v. City of Worchester Police Dep’t, 338 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D.
Mass. 2004) (same).
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. Cf. Carolyn Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart to Improve Comprehension
of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 262, 266 (2002) (finding increased
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prove useful for bolstering juror understanding—even in situations
where the likelihood of inconsistent verdicts is nonexistent.
III. PRINCIPLES OF JURY COMPREHENSION AND DECISIONMAKING
This Part highlights some basic principles of jury cognition
identified by the academic literature and discusses how they can be
applied to the flowchart verdict sheet. At the outset, two important
considerations should be recognized. First, the majority of the
academic literature on jury decisionmaking and comprehension
focuses on jury instructions. Second, the flowchart verdict sheet
addresses inconsistent verdicts based on juror confusion resulting
from the verdict sheet itself, as opposed to confusion from the jury
instructions.
With these considerations in mind, understanding how and to
what extent juries understand the judge’s instructions may be
worthwhile for a few reasons. First, as discussed below, the language
of the flowchart verdict sheets is intended to track the language of the
113
judge’s jury instructions.
Thus, the reasons behind a jury’s
understanding or misunderstanding of the jury instructions may be
correlated with a jury’s understanding of the verdict sheets. Second,
many of the remedies proposed by current legal reform literature deal
with bolstering the jury’s comprehension of various aspects of the
114
trial, especially with the jury instructions. Exploring the reasons why
scholars have suggested these different remedies may thus provide
valuable insights into why a flowchart verdict sheet may also assist
juries.
A. Jury Miscomprehension
Whether juries are capable of understanding jury instructions
sufficiently to render an adequate verdict is relevant given the
increasing complexity and length of modern civil litigation, which is
often extremely information intensive and features armies of expert
115
witnesses. Numerous academics have consistently observed that

comprehension when mock jurors used flowcharts to supplement jury instructions during
deliberations). For a more detailed discussion on how flowcharts and other visual aids can
improve comprehension, see infra Part III.B.3.
113. See infra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part III.B.1–.2.
115. See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 190 (1990) (observing that for one particular civil commercial
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juries do not completely understand the judge’s instructions. One
prime culprit of faulty comprehension is the jury’s general lack of
117
familiarity with complex legal doctrines and standards. Juror
confusion may be further caused by the amount of legal jargon—or
“legalese”—and the complex wording and sentence structures
118
prevalent in jury instructions. Psycholinguistic researchers have
categorized these causes of juror miscomprehension as those relating
to the vocabulary used and those relating to the grammar or sentence
structure—in other words, how the “particular words are arranged
119
into phrases, clauses and entire sentences.”
Other factors may affect comprehension of jury instructions in
addition to these psycholinguistic barriers, such as the complexity of
120
the trial or the education levels of the jurors. The complex and
sometimes technical nature of modern litigation also raises the
related question of whether juries can even comprehend the case
121
itself, much less the instructions. Incomplete jury comprehension of
the case as a whole, apart from the jury instructions, may also result
from prohibitions against the jury taking notes, being allowed to ask
122
questions, or discussing the case before deliberating. Regardless of
the reason, flaws in jury comprehension can have unwanted
consequences—for instance, juries may be confused about what they
are allowed to find, they may not adequately understand the legal

matter, the pretrial discovery involved over one-hundred-thousand pages in depositions and
that the trial was slated to last one year); Landsman, supra note 40, at 295.
116. See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the
Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 596–97 (1997) (“It is common to find
over half the instructions misunderstood, and even the most optimistic results indicate that
roughly 30% of the instructions are not understood.”); Dylan Lager Murray, Plain English or
Plain Confusing?, 62 MO. L. REV. 345, 347 (1997) (citing studies identifying widespread “juror
miscomprehension of pattern instructions” from different states); Walter W. Steele, Jr. &
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 77, 78 (1988) (“Recent social science research has demonstrated empirically that juror
comprehension of instructions is appallingly low.”).
117. Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 589.
118. Id. at 597. The abstruse language in pattern jury instructions is attributed to the
drafters’ intent to “precisely state the law, rather than with the aim of clarity and
comprehensibility.” Id. at 623.
119. Murray, supra note 116, at 351.
120. See Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 616–20 (describing how trial complexity, sociodemographic variables, personality factors, and preexisting mental representations affect juror
comprehension).
121. Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 119.
122. Id. at 120.
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issues and how they fit together, and they may not even remember all
the legal issues presented.
B. Current Legal Reform Remedies
Current legal reform literature offers an impressive array of
solutions aimed toward assisting juries in reaching an intelligent
verdict. Many of these solutions deal with improving juror
comprehension within the context of jury instructions. A number of
solutions, however, also focus on improving juror comprehension,
retention, recall, and decisionmaking throughout the different stages
of the trial. This Note categorizes the different solutions into three
broad approaches: solutions that affect the words the jury encounters
(“psycholinguistic approaches”), solutions that affect the jury’s
involvement in trial (“participatory approaches”), and solutions that
affect the jury’s visual-reasoning abilities (“visual approaches”). In
doing so, this Note does not argue that any of these solutions
necessarily should be implemented, but seeks to add to the existing
legal reform literature on juror comprehension and decisionmaking
by mining useful principles from other proposed reforms.
1. Psycholinguistic Approaches. The psycholinguistic approaches
seek to decrease juror confusion and increase juror comprehension of
their instructions by rewriting pattern jury instructions based on
123
“psycholinguistic principles of ‘simple English.’” In the same way
that miscomprehension may result both from the language used and
how the words are organized, psycholinguistic approaches focus on
124
both simplifying the words used and structuring them clearly.
Simplifying the language of jury instructions can be achieved
through several means. One straightforward method is simply to
125
eliminate legal jargon. Psycholinguistic research has suggested that
jurors “understand and remember familiar terms more easily than
126
uncommon words and phrases.” The research shows, perhaps

123. Murray, supra note 116, at 348. Although the psycholinguistic approaches mentioned in
this Section are geared toward rewriting jury instructions, the principles may also be applicable
to other phases of the trial, such as how evidence is presented to the jury. Schwarzer, supra note
92, at 132; see also Samuel H. Solomon, How Jurors Make Decisions: A Practical & Systematic
Approach to Understanding Jury Behavior, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 175, 182 (2003) (discussing the
barriers to juror comprehension of technical, industry-specific words).
124. Murray, supra note 116, at 351.
125. Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 623.
126. Murray, supra note 116, at 354.
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intuitively, that jurors who read and hear words that appear more
frequently in the English language can process those words more
127
quickly, allowing them to concentrate on the remaining instructions.
Using verbs instead of nouns derived from verbs can also prevent jury
instructions from being overly abstract and increase jury
128
comprehension. Along similar lines, using the actual names of
parties as opposed to the abstract “Plaintiff” or “Defendant” may
129
reduce confusion.
Some commentators have also suggested
minimizing the use of negative words such as “no,” “not,” or “never”
as well as words containing negative prefixes such as “mis-,” “dis-,” or
130
“un-.” Because negative words or prefixes force jurors to first
comprehend the word’s positive meaning before flipping the meaning
of the word to the negative, they add an unnecessary extra step to
131
comprehension.
However, merely using simple words in jury instructions does not
guarantee juror comprehension “if drafters put those words together
132
in an incomprehensible fashion.” Other methods focus on forming
the words into a comprehensible structure. Because the complexity
and comprehensibility of a sentence are inversely related, decreasing
the complexity of a sentence—by minimizing the number of
dependent clauses in a sentence for example—often increases the
133
jury’s understanding of the sentence. The location of the dependent
clauses may also be significant—placing dependent clauses after the
independent clause allows the juror to understand the central idea of
the sentence before needing to consider the supplemental thoughts in
134
the dependent clause. In addition to reducing structural complexity,
limiting the use of the passive voice by removing extraneous words
and clearly indicating the “doer” of the action also assists jurors in

127. Id. at 354–55.
128. Id. at 355–56. Compare “the collision of the cars occurred last Friday” with “the cars
collided last Friday.”
129. Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 623.
130. Murray, supra note 116, at 356–57.
131. Id. at 357.
132. Id. at 358.
133. Id. at 359; see Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 623–24 (discussing the improved
comprehension resulting from removing embedded phrases as well as prepositional phrases
starting with “as to”).
134. Murray, supra note 116, at 360. For example, compare a sentence in which the
dependent clause appears first, “While he fed his pet ostrich, Chad hummed to himself,” with a
sentence in which the independent clause appears first, “Chad hummed to himself while he fed
his pet ostrich.”
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understanding and retaining the jury instructions. Just as empirical
studies confirm that rewriting jury instructions to conform to these
psycholinguistic principles has proven effective in increasing jury
136
comprehension, so too may conforming the language of the
flowchart verdict sheets to these principles prove effective in doing
the same.
2. Participatory Approaches. The participatory approaches seek
to minimize faulty decisionmaking and increase jury comprehension
by decreasing or increasing the jury’s role in different stages of the
137
trial. One solution, recognizing the complexity of modern civil
138
litigation, proposes that juries should be completely excluded from
deciding certain kinds of complex cases, thus preventing faulty
139
decisionmaking caused by the complexity of the trial. Other
proposed options for improving comprehension that stop short of
completely eliminating the jury’s role in certain cases include
eliminating undisputed or irrelevant issues, reducing the amount of
cumulative evidence, and imposing time limits on the trial itself or on
140
examination of witnesses by the parties.
On the other end of the spectrum are approaches that give juries
a more active trial role, with the reasoning that increasing the jury’s
participation will allow the jury to be more effective in carrying out its
responsibility to decide cases and will express confidence to the public
141
that the jury can do so competently. Similar to the approaches that
limit the cases or issues that juries can decide, the approaches that
increase juror participation in the trial process are prophylactic in
nature—by preventing inaccurate decisionmaking, they prevent the
135. Id. at 361. Some scholars have further traced diminished comprehension to the passive
voice specifically within the context of dependent clauses. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R.
Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1326 (1979). Professor Charrow offers the following
example, taken from an actual jury instruction: “You must never speculate to be true any
insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness.” Id. at 1326 n.53.
136. See Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 623–25 (summarizing the results of studies
measuring the effectiveness of psycholinguistic approaches to improving jury comprehension).
137. Friedland, supra note 115, at 191–92.
138. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
139. Friedland, supra note 115, at 191–92; cf. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631
F.2d 1069, 1079, 1089–90 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that entrusting a jury with deciding complex
cases may violate due process if the jury would be “unable to understand the case and decide it
rationally”).
140. Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 122–25.
141. Friedland, supra note 115, at 192.

FANG IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

310

10/21/2014 6:07 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:287
142

need for ex post alteration or overturning of the verdict. These
approaches have also garnered considerable support by legal reform
scholars and include allowing the jury to take notes during the trial
process, to submit questions to witnesses or the judge, and to discuss
143
the trial with other jurors prior to deliberating. And still other
options have been suggested for increasing comprehension and
retention, including providing instructions and education to the jury
144
before the trial begins as well as at the close of the trial, or
145
providing the jury with a written copy of the jury instructions. Many
of these proposed approaches, such as preliminary orientations, juror
note taking, and juror questioning, are also embodied in the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Principles for Juries and Jury
146
Trials.
3. Visual Approaches. Commentators have also proposed visual
approaches to improving juror comprehension, retention, and
decisionmaking. Some have suggested the use of visual aids such as
maps, charts, graphics, timelines, diagrams, video presentations, and
demonstratives to help jurors better understand the evidence

142. Id. at 199.
143. See, e.g., Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-Aid Innovations
on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 184, 187–89 (2003) (exploring
the effectiveness of juror note taking on comprehension and recall); Friedland, supra note 115,
at 209–15 (summarizing studies finding positive effects of note taking and juror questioning in
federal trials); Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 635–36 (noting that “structured
predeliberation discussions may appreciably aid the decision-making process”); Steven D.
Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 271, 280–82 (1997) (concluding that although note taking and
juror questioning may only have marginal benefits, they should still be considered); Schwarzer,
supra note 92, at 137–43 (offering suggestions as to what the implementation of juror note
taking, questioning, and discussions should look like).
144. Keith Broyles, Note, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for
Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 731–32
(1996); Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 129–32; see Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 632
(concluding that jury preinstruction and postinstruction presented together can improve juror
comprehension).
145. Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 131; see Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do
Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror
Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 428 (1990) (concluding that the increase
in comprehension levels as a result of written instructions was statistically significant);
Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 626–28 (summarizing the results of studies concerning the
effect on comprehension of providing written jury instructions and suggesting that they at least
should be considered because they increase juror satisfaction with the trial process).
146. AM. BAR ASS’N, AMERICAN JURY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS passim (2005).
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presented in the case, to facilitate comprehension and retention of
148
the judge’s instructions on the law, and to assist jurors during
149
deliberation if the visuals are admitted into evidence. In addition,
lawyers may use visual aids as advocacy tools with the end goal of
150
having the jury complete the verdict form in their client’s favor.
When combined with an oral presentation, electronic media in
particular have been identified as an effective method of
communicating information to juries given society’s increasing
151
familiarity with technology.
Commentators, however, have argued that even visuals and
graphics that do not involve video screens may be effective in
improving comprehension and decisionmaking for several reasons.
Visuals, for example, may provide a “visceral, directly subconscious
connection” to the jury that allows jurors to visualize the relationships
between different legal claims, and among the elements within
152
claims. Some authors also cite physiological literature to support the
notion that humans may indeed be innately predisposed to use
pictures and other images because visuals provide advantages over
words alone in terms of processing, remembering, and recalling
153
information. Jury comprehension, retention, and recall seem to be
maximized by combining visual and verbal presentations of
154
information, as is true with electronic media. Finally, the visual
presentation of some types of information may simply be more
155
accurate, straightforward, and effortless.
Although many scholars have extolled the virtues of visual aids
such as diagrams and charts in the courtroom, surprisingly few have

147. Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 136. For a more detailed analysis on strategies and
considerations in implementing different types of visual aids, see generally Ronald J. Rychlak,
The Graphic Explanation: Why Less is More, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 111 (2012).
148. Solomon, supra note 123, at 183; see generally Firoz Dattu, Illustrated Jury Instructions:
A Proposal, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 67 (1998) (proposing the use of diagrams and other
illustrations as a supplement to jury instructions to aid jury comprehension).
149. Daniel W. Dugan, A Picture is Worth 999 Words: The Importance and Effectiveness of
Courtroom Visual Presentations, 1 REYNOLDS CT. & MEDIA L.J. 503, 521 (2011).
150. Solomon, supra note 123, at 184.
151. Dugan, supra note 149, at 504. Dugan argues that the technologically savvy generation
of potential jurors is used to receiving information from “televisions, computer screens, and
personal computing devices, which all employ an active mix of pictures and words.” Id. at 505.
152. Solomon, supra note 123, at 189.
153. Dugan, supra note 149, at 506–07.
154. Id. at 509–10; Dattu, supra note 148, at 81–83, 89–90.
155. Rychlak, supra note 147, at 111.
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engaged in extended discussions specifically on the merits of
flowcharts. One study, however, has addressed how flowcharts could
156
be used to bolster understanding of jury instructions. The study
sought to measure the effect of a flowchart that detailed the elements
of a self-defense claim on a jury’s ability to later describe the
157
elements and apply them to a particular case. The researchers
concluded that having access to a flowchart that complemented the
jury instructions and, more importantly, being able to refer to the
flowchart during deliberations did indeed assist the jury’s
158
comprehension of the instructions. In addition to providing the
same advantages in recall and retention as other visual approaches,
the organizational nature of flowcharts may provide an extra measure
159
of recall. Lastly, flowcharts may be especially helpful in learning
and recall processes by visually mapping the underlying relationships
160
between legal concepts, standards, and claims.
C. Incorporating Principles of Jury Comprehension and
Decisionmaking in Flowchart Verdict Sheets
The flowchart verdict sheet essentially consists of language from
the jury instructions situated within a visually-presented decision tree.
Although the primary focus of this Note is on the visual dimension
and presentation of the flowchart verdict sheets, the substantive
language contained within the sheets should, in any case, track the
language of the jury instructions and be worded in a way that “avoids
161
the potential for confusing or misleading the jury.” Because the
increases in visual reasoning and clarity provided by flowcharts
cannot fully address the problems caused by unclear language or
faulty logic, the language contained in flowchart verdict sheets should
follow the psycholinguistic principles discussed above to minimize

156. Semmler et al., supra note 112.
157. Id. at 262.
158. Id. at 266. The researchers also suggested that a “closer integration of the flow-chart
material and the judge’s verbal instructions” could amplify the effectiveness of the flowchart. Id.
at 267.
159. See id. at 263 (“Several studies of text comprehension indicate that material is better
recalled if it has an obvious underlying structure.” (citation omitted)).
160. See id. (commenting that “[v]arious researchers have suggested that diagrams would
more easily hold jurors’ attention and aid in the comprehension and retention of complicated
legal concepts” (citations omitted)).
161. Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 690 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Petes v.
Hayes, 664 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks omitted)); see also supra note 158.
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juror confusion and maximize juror comprehension. As one legal
scholar has noted, “the jury’s capacity to deliberate and reach sound
results also may be compromised by instructions that are written in
163
abstruse terms . . . .” And as another commentator writing on the
importance of clear language in jury instructions—and presumably by
extension, the verdict form—stressed, “even in relatively simple cases
what the jurors hear is little more than legal mumbo jumbo to
164
them.”
Although the same psycholinguistic principles for simplifying the
language in jury instructions can also be applied to text-only verdict
sheets, the flowchart verdict sheet confers additional structural
advantages over its text-only brethren. At a glance, the proposed
verdict sheet visually contexualizes how one discrete element of a
claim or affirmative defense connects to another, as well as how all of
the elements of a claim, an affirmative defense to a claim, or multiple
165
claims, may fit together from a “big picture” perspective.
Conversely, because the meaning and information of a text-only
verdict sheet is contained solely within the words used, the text-only
sheet overlooks an entire dimension of presenting information.
Furthermore, because the jury would use the flowchart as the verdict
sheet itself, jurors would benefit from the recall and retention
advantages associated with accessing the flowchart while
166
deliberating.
In addition to the gains in comprehension and decisionmaking
that can be realized by mapping the relationships between the
questions posed to the jurors, the formal if-then statements that
convey the consequences of the jurors’ decisions may be represented
with greater ease and simplicity in a visual manner through the use of
167
arrows. For example, consider the following:

162. See supra notes 123–36 and accompanying text.
163. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 52, at 1099.
164. William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 731, 732 (1981); see supra Part III.A; cf. Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 701 (7th
Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a “verdict form must ‘. . . clearly state the relevant issues,’ and
‘[a]mbiguous, biased, misleading, or confusing questions may warrant reversal’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Mattson v. Schultz, 145 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 1998))).
165. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2. Using Text to Make Decisions
Question 4: Did the plaintiff Ms. Palsgraf prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the Long Island Railroad Company’s actions
proximately caused her injuries?
YES: _______
NO: _______
If you answered YES to Question 4, please proceed to Question 5.
If you answered NO to Question 4, please proceed to Question 6.

With this text-only example, the formal if-then statements force
the reader to take the additional steps of reading the text, processing
the meaning of the words, visualizing the relationship between the
answer to Question 4 and the next question, and retaining the
abstract decision tree in the reader’s memory. Instead of showing the
juror how the different elements fit together, the text-only verdict
sheet merely tells the juror how they fit together in the abstract. By
comparison, the same question and paths following from each answer
can be represented visually as follows:
Figure 3. Using Arrows to Make Decisions
Question 4: Did Ms. Palsgraf prove
by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Long Island Railroad
Company’s actions proximately
caused her injuries?
Yes

No

Question 5

Question 6

Here, the information is conveyed by the substantive language of
the questions and by the structure of the flowchart. As this example
shows, the flowchart verdict sheet visualizes the relationship between
the different pieces of the verdict sheet, freeing the juror’s memory
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and cognitive capacities for decisionmaking. In addition, very little
explanation of the structure is necessary. Because the average
layperson intuitively understands the meaning of arrows—for
example, on road signs—the risk of misinterpreting the symbol is
lessened. Staying with the road analogy, it is not hard to imagine an
increase in traffic or accidents if arrows in turn lanes were replaced
with textual directions: “Only if you are turning LEFT, use this lane.
If you are turning LEFT or continuing FORWARD, use this lane.”
For a jury, the arrows combined with the “Yes” and “No” labels
clearly and instantaneously direct it to the next appropriate decision
based on its answer without introducing extra steps into the jury’s
thought process, such as reading the textual directions, processing
their meaning, and synthesizing them into the larger context.
In summary, flowchart verdict sheets may help minimize juror
confusion and improve juror decisionmaking, comprehension, and
retention. By explicitly communicating to the jury the decision paths
they may or may not take, the flowchart verdict sheets prevent
nonsensical decisionmaking and impossible results. They may also be
more efficient in helping juries understand how the elements of a
168
claim or different legal claims fit together. Finally, by integrating the
language of jury instructions with the visual dimension afforded by
flowcharts, flowchart verdict sheets may assist jurors in understanding
169
and recalling the legal concepts while they deliberate.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF VISUAL DESIGN
A basic understanding of visual design principles is essential to
designing verdict sheets that effectively use graphics. Although the
fields of information design and data visualization are indeed broad,
this Part focuses on the work of one prominent pioneer to exemplify
how visual design principles may be applied to flowchart verdict
sheets. Edward Tufte, professor emeritus of political science,
computer science, and statistics at Yale University, has written and
published extensively in the fields of data visualization and
information design, and how to present that content in a clear, simple,

168. See Dugan, supra note 149, at 507 (“Not only do images get stored more quickly and
directly into the brain than words, but . . . visual images can be retrieved (and are, thus,
available for use) more quickly than words.”).
169. See supra note 158.
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170

and intuitive manner. Although Tufte’s books on visual design and
information presentation do not specifically address how flowcharts
can be used to increase clarity and decrease confusion, his useful
examples, insights, and basic principles on visual design and
presentation may prove useful in guiding the design of flowchart
verdict sheets and support their use as a viable solution to
inconsistent verdicts.
A. Escaping the Linear Dimension
By opening up the visual dimension and providing context for
the relationship between legal claims or among the elements of a
claim, flowcharts can augment a jury’s comprehension by overcoming
the linear presentation of information prevalent in traditional verdict
sheets. Perhaps the most appropriate and accessible example of a
linear stream of information that can decrease comprehension and
reasoning—not to mention consciousness in some cases—is the oft171
maligned Microsoft PowerPoint. As Tufte explains, the culprit is the
cognitive style of PowerPoint—a “deeply hierarchical single-path
structure” that ends up removing useful context and stifling spatial
172
analysis. This temporal sequencing of information, or as Tufte puts
it, “one damn slide after another,” makes it “difficult to understand
173
context and evaluate relationships.” Rather, Tufte contrasts this
linear stacking of information with the display of information within
174
space where “[v]isual reasoning usually works more effectively.” In
the PowerPoint context, an effective visual display might entail
175
showing multiple slides simultaneously.
Thus, whether in a
PowerPoint presentation or in a verdict sheet, “[s]patial parallelism

170. See generally EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE COGNITIVE STYLE OF POWERPOINT (2003)
[hereinafter TUFTE, POWERPOINT]; EDWARD R. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION (1990)
[hereinafter TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION]; TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84;
TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 84.
171. See Elisabeth Bumiller, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2010, at A1 (noting military commanders’ concerns that PowerPoint can “create the
illusion of understanding . . . stifle[] discussion, critical thinking and thoughtful decisionmaking”); Angela R. Garber, Death By Powerpoint, SMALLBUSINESSCOMPUTING
(Apr. 1, 2001), http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/biztools/article.php/684871/Death-ByPowerpoint.htm (discussing the confusion, boredom, and lack of retention that often accompany
PowerPoint presentations).
172. TUFTE, POWERPOINT, supra note 170, at 4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 23.
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takes advantage of our notable capacity to reason about multiple
176
images that appear simultaneously within our eyespan.”
Tufte also provides an example of a chart used in a mob trial
detailing the criminal activity of government informants, with the
informants’ names on one axis, a list of crimes on the other, and a
bold black “X” occupying each intersection of informant and crime:
177

Figure 4. Two-Dimensional Informant Chart

One can easily imagine how this visual display is a more useful
medium for comparisons, pattern recognition, and the dissemination
of information as opposed to a mere one-dimensional stream of
informants and their respective crimes. Indeed, Tufte recognizes that
these graphics could be useful in trials, in which the information often
consists of “linear, nonreversible, one-dimensional sequencing of talk
178
talk talk.”
In contrast, the strict “linearly organized flow of words” in
sentences overlooks a useful way to make sense of the information
179
within them by removing the visual dimension. In short, escaping
the linear dimension by placing information within a context—or
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 31.
Id.
TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 178.
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otherwise displaying it in two-dimensional space—increases the
viewer’s ability to understand how different pieces of information fit
together, and more effectively taps into the viewer’s visual-reasoning
capabilities.
B. Multifunctioning Elements and Micro-Macro Designs
A micro-macro design provides not only specific, detailed
information on a micro-level, but also simultaneously provides
contextual information when the viewer looks at the design from a
180
bird’s-eye view. An example of a micro-macro design is a stem-andleaf plot, in which each data point itself contains information and also
aggregates with other data points to form a frequency distribution.
The following figure demonstrates how such a graphic can be used to
display two layers of information about the heights of volcanoes:
181

Figure 5. Volcano Height Stem-and-Leaf Plot

In this stem-and-leaf plot, the digits to the left of the vertical line
indicate the height in thousands of feet, while the digits to the right
indicate the same in hundreds of feet. Each digit to the right,
however, also corresponds to the height of one volcano. Thus, the

180. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 37–38.
181. Id. at 46.
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stem-and-leaf plot relays information about the heights of individual
volcanoes and the number of volcanoes that fall within each height
182
range. As opposed to a purely typographical listing of information,
a stem-and-leaf plot confers the advantages of comparison and
183
context by creating an extra visual dimension. In that sense, micromacro designs may also contain multifunctioning elements in which
184
the “same ink serves more than one informational purpose.”
Tufte expands on this idea in The Visual Display of Quantitative
Information, illustrating how multifunctioning graphical elements
may “carry data information and also perform a design function
usually left to non-data-ink” or “show several different pieces of
185
data.” For example, a single blot on a blot map may reveal the
physical location of the blot in space, with the potential for storing
and communicating even more information based on its color, tone,
186
or shape. Similarly, coordinates in a two-dimensional graph can not
only store information about the variables measured by the two axes,
but can also—if represented by digits—communicate value or time
187
188
order. And of course, like a stem-and-leaf plot, a scatterplot’s
coordinates in the aggregate may also act as a micro-macro design
that allows viewers to visualize the data and patterns contained
within.
C. Escaping the Information Prison
Tufte writes that “[c]onfusion and clutter are failures of design,
189
not attributes of information.” One way to highlight content and
reduce visual noise and clutter is to layer the information, or establish

182. A typographical presentation of information merely lists the information in a linear
stream of numbers and letters. The typographical listing of the volcano-height information for
the first two rows in Figure 5 would thus look like this: 900, 800, 700, 600, 600, 500, 600, 200,
1900, 1700, 1700, 1100, 1900, 1600, 1300, 1000. In contrast to a visual diagram, it would be
difficult to visualize the frequency of volcanoes falling within a specific height range.
183. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 47.
184. Id. For another example illustrating the same concepts of dual micro-macro designs and
multifunctioning elements, see id. at 24–26.
185. TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 139.
186. Id.; e.g., TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 40 (presenting a
population-density map that uses dots of varying size to illustrate a population’s location and
concentration).
187. TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 149–50. For an example of such a “doublefunctioning maneuver,” see id. at 151.
188. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
189. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 53.
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a visual hierarchy of different types of information based on their
190
importance. To illustrate, Tufte points to a depiction of the anatomy
of the human ear:
191

Figure 6. The “Pierced” Ear

The labels of the different parts of the ear are connected to their
respective parts by lines so thick as to practically “penetrate this
human ear”—in fact, Tufte notes the lines are “[h]eavier than the
192
linework for the ear itself.”
Muting secondary or structural
elements—objects such as arrows, pointers, boxes, or grids—by
simply making them lighter in tone may, however, increase the clarity
of the primary content while also reducing the visual clutter caused by
the background, content, and structure competing for the viewer’s
attention:

190. Id.; TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 84, at 74.
191. TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 84, at 73. From THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, copyright © 1971, 1983, 1987 Random House. Used
with permission of Random House LLC.
192. Id.; see TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 186 (“The contrast in line weight
represents contrast in meaning. The greater meaning is given to the greater line weight . . . .”).
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193

Figure 7. The “Unpierced” Ear

Tufte stresses that “when everything (background, structure, content)
is emphasized, nothing is emphasized; the design will often be noisy,
194
cluttered, and informationally flat.” Muting secondary elements
thus allows the viewer to concentrate on the content instead of
195
unnecessarily focusing on the container of the content.
196
Another technique for layering information is the use of color.
Tufte provides a powerful example from an IBM copier-machineparts manual that displays “300 small parts and their identifying
197
numbers.” Despite the intricacy of the diagram, one can still easily
differentiate between the part and the identifying number because

193. TUFTE, VISUAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 84, at 74.
194. Id. Tufte refers to one particular offender as an “information prison,” in which content
displayed in a grid of the same color and greater thickness ended up being upstaged by the less
important structure. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 63.
195. For such a demonstration, see TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at
64.
196. Id. at 53–54.
197. Id. at 54.
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the parts are printed in black, whereas the secondary labels are
198
printed in thinner red ink.
In addition to creating distinct layers through the use of tone and
199
color, Tufte provides examples of layering through different shapes
200
and sizes, as well as the intentional use of negative areas of white
201
space. Perhaps Tufte sums this lesson up best by stating: “Failure to
differentiate among layers of reading leads to cluttered and
202
incoherent displays filled with disinformation . . . .”
D. Integrating Text with Graphics
A final principle of aesthetics derived from Tufte’s work on
203
graphic design is the integration of words and graphics. One
underlying rationale of information integration is the idea that words,
pictures, graphics, and tables all accomplish the same purpose of
204
disseminating information, albeit in different ways. In essence,
segregating the information based on whether it is “packaged” as text
or graphic is tantamount to physically interrupting the flow of
information simply for the sake of formalistic convention and is as
irrational as replacing graphics with paragraphs of words and
205
scattering them “out of sequence with the rest of the text.”
A second rationale is that such segregation of textual and graphic
information may force the viewer’s attention to switch from one place
to another, even though the textual and graphic information may be
206
substantively related. A familiar example from academic literature
and scientific journals is the “clumsy and diverting” use of references
such as “See Fig. 2,” in which the figure referred to by the text is
207
located on an entirely different page. In these cases, the arbitrary
198. Id.; see Dugan, supra note 149, at 507–08 (“[R]esearch shows that color is perceived
first by the eye and brain, followed by pictures, then symbols, and lastly, words.”).
199. Although not all courthouses may currently be equipped to print materials in fine
gradations of tones and colors, the use of colors is just one example of how courts may in the
future create visual layers.
200. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 58.
201. Id. at 60–61.
202. Id. at 65.
203. See TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 181 (describing the “principle of
text/graphic/table integration”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 180; see Dugan, supra note 149, at 517–18 (describing techniques for integrating
visual and verbal presentations).
207. TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 181.
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segregation of information based on whether it is textual or graphic
should yield to clarity and understanding. Tufte himself quite
effectively vouches for the fusion of text and graphics by consistently
integrating graphics seamlessly throughout his own text. Most
ingeniously (and quite literally), Tufte takes a page from polymath
Leonardo da Vinci’s book, nesting a picture of a page from da Vinci’s
journal—which itself contains da Vinci’s own sketches embedded
within da Vinci’s written text—within Tufte’s own discussion of the
208
merits of text-graphic integration.
E. Incorporating Principles of Visual Design in Flowchart Verdict
Sheets
Ultimately, the principles mentioned in this Part are not to be
209
applied rigidly or mathematically. To the contrary, their purpose is
to promote clarity in presentation, and in doing so, to “give visual
210
access to the subtle and the difficult.” Flowchart verdict sheets
designed in conformity with Tufte’s principles of visual design and
presentation can maximize understanding and clarity while
minimizing confusion. The two-dimensional structure of the flowchart
allows the jury to escape the linear stacking of information and the
concomitant decreases in comprehension and reasoning that result
211
from the use of a conventional text-only verdict sheet. As opposed
to a linear stream of words, the flowchart verdict sheet enhances the
jury’s spatial-analysis capabilities and provides context for how the
different ideas, elements, defenses, or claims in the verdict sheet fit
212
together.
The proposed verdict sheets also serve as an example of a macro213
micro design. For example, consider a verdict sheet that asks the
jury to decide whether the plaintiff has proven the elements of the
claim. Imagine there is also an affirmative defense to that claim, the
elements of which are displayed on the side opposite to the elements
of the claim. Although each individual box contains substantive
information about the element, the boxes in the aggregate also
visually communicate information on the number of elements each

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 191.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra notes 171–79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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party has to prove and which party must prove them, information
that is more readily processed through the visual dimension.
The flowcharts can also decrease any attention switching that can
215
result from following a text-only verdict sheet. Using the example of
Ms. Palsgraf, a jury’s attention may initially be focused on the
substantive question of whether the Long Island Railroad Company’s
216
actions proximately caused her injuries. Upon answering that
question, the jury must then switch its attention to processing the
textual instructions indicating which question to answer next. The text
of the next question may also be physically segregated from the
217
textual instructions directing the jury to answer that question. On
the other hand, by allowing the jury to rely on the flowchart to
correctly determine the next question based on its answer to a
previous question, the flowchart verdict sheet allows the jury to focus
solely on decisionmaking.
In addition to the visual design principles already incorporated
into the flowchart verdict sheet, some final design recommendations
may be useful. For example, color may be used to distinguish the
plaintiff’s claims from the defendant’s affirmative defenses, or even to
highlight the two outcomes of which party prevails. The use of color
adds an additional visual dimension that conveys information without
the need to use words and creates layers to help the jurors quickly
218
distinguish between the plaintiff and the defendant. Flowchart
designers can also experiment with color and line width to mute or
219
soften secondary elements. For example, the structural boxes in
which the elements or claims are situated could be drawn with a
thinner line or in a muted tone to focus the jury’s attention on the
220
substantive language content within the boxes. On the other hand,
the arrows may be drawn with bolder lines, or even in different
colors, to illuminate the various decision paths. By creating a visual
hierarchy of language content, structure, and decision paths through
the use of color, line width, and the like, flowchart designers can
221
reduce potential clutter and noise.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 2.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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Flowchart verdict sheets aim to communicate information to the
jury through language as well as structure. The language of the
written interrogatories communicates the immediate question the
jury must answer. The interrogatories may, for example, ask the jury
to determine some fact in the case, determine liability for a claim, or
determine whether an element of a claim or an affirmative defense
has been met. The structure of the verdict sheet complements the
language by informing the jury what it should do next after answering
a particular interrogatory. By illustrating the relationships between
different interrogatories based on the jury’s answers, the flowchart
also illustrates the valid decision paths the jury may take. The
arrangement of the interrogatories also serves as a visual reminder to
the jury of what the plaintiff needs to show to prevail and which party
bears the burden of proof if an affirmative defense is involved. Thus,
the proposed verdict sheets allow jurors to focus on intelligent
decisionmaking without requiring jurors to retain a mental decision
tree in their heads or to commit the legal concepts from the jury
instructions to memory, thereby facilitating “visual access to the
222
subtle and the difficult.”
V. OBJECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the trial court’s wide discretion in forming the verdict
and academic support for the use of visual aids in promoting
223
comprehension and decisionmaking, flowchart verdict sheets have
not been implemented on any significant level, if at all. This Part first
identifies and addresses two possible rationales for why judges and
lawyers have not given serious consideration to the use of flowchart
verdict sheets. This Part then offers some preliminary
recommendations that may alleviate some of the hesitancy toward
adopting these or other sorts of graphic verdict sheets.
A. What’s the Big Deal?
The first rationale is that even if flowchart verdict sheets do in
fact mitigate the risk of inconsistent verdicts by minimizing confusion
and improving comprehension and decisionmaking abilities, the range
of situations in which they are helpful may be so limited that the costs
of implementation would be greater than the costs of inconsistent jury

222. TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 84, at 191.
223. See supra Parts I.B & III.B.
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verdicts caused by juror confusion. One study estimates that there
were around ten thousand federal jury trials in 1990, about half of
224
which were civil. Even if a case survives the dispositive motion stage
to reach the verdict stage, legal scholars have remarked that the
traditional general verdict is “used almost exclusively in the great
225
majority of courts.” Although the trial court has complete discretion
226
to use verdicts under Rule 49, this same discretion means that
judges may simply opt to use the traditional verdict sheet to sidestep
the problem of inconsistencies in the interrogatories. And even if the
trial court agrees to use a Rule 49 verdict, it is likely that not every
verdict will contain an inconsistency in the interrogatories.
Furthermore, for those verdicts that do contain inconsistencies, many
procedural safeguards exist that prevent the time and money costs of
227
a new trial. As discussed above, the Rule 49 framework itself
imposes a duty on the judge to harmonize inconsistent interrogatories
and also gives the judge the options of entering judgment on the
answers or resubmitting the verdict to the jury for further
228
consideration. In addition, there are tools that exist outside of Rule
49 that allow the judge to remedy inconsistent civil verdicts, such as
229
entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
So then, what is the big deal? If the applicability of the flowchart
verdict sheet is to be limited in so many ways as to essentially remove
its teeth, why should the flowchart verdict sheet even merit
consideration? Even if the majority of federal civil cases do not
involve potential inconsistencies that could be mitigated by flowchart
verdict sheets, using flowcharts in some appreciable number of cases
in which they may act is still better than using flowcharts in none. As
exemplified by Anderson v. County of Suffolk, inconsistent verdicts
230
do not simply exist in an abstract vacuum. The time and money
costs associated with a new trial or with retaining the jury for an extra
day to reconsider an inconsistent verdict, as rare as they may be, are

224. Landsman, supra note 40, at 289.
225. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 52, at 1108; see Driver, supra note 104, at 496
(discussing why special verdicts under Rule 49(a) have seen such limited use in federal court).
The overuse of traditional general verdicts might actually result in an underestimation of juror
confusion by masking the jury’s thought processes and decisionmaking.
226. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part I.A.
228. See supra Part I.A.2.
229. Landsman, supra note 40, at 304.
230. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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231

still real. And any potential rarity of inconsistent verdicts caused by
juror confusion does not necessarily undermine the flowchart verdict
232
sheet’s efficacy as a prophylactic against juror confusion generally.
In addition, although judges in civil cases have discretion to enter
judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, some commentators
have suggested that judicial hesitation toward altering or overturning
a verdict may in part exist because “the jury is expected to be the fact
233
finder and not merely an advisory body.” In contrast to flowchart
verdict sheets, these postverdict “fixes” correct some unwanted result
only after the fact as opposed to preventing the faulty
234
decisionmaking.
A related objection is that the scope of cases in which the
flowchart verdict sheet would be helpful may be further limited by
the complexity of the case. In other words, the flowchart verdict sheet
may be less helpful for extremely simple or extremely complex
235
cases. For example, the benefit from using a flowchart verdict sheet
as opposed to a conventional verdict sheet for the simplest cases
236
would be marginal because the risk of confusion would be low. On
the other hand, flowchart verdict sheets may decrease in effectiveness
if the case is too complex. Some cases, such as Apple Inc. v. Samsung
237
Electronics Co., were complex due to their highly technical subject
matter. The verdict form for the patent case spanned twenty pages
and required the jury to answer “more than 500 discrete questions
231. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. In one complex patent case, a litigant—
recognizing that “[t]he likelihood of an inconsistent verdict is a possibility despite the jury’s best
efforts”—requested time to review the verdict form to “conserve the resources of the Court and
the parties.” Samsung’s Request, supra note 31, at 1. Ultimately, Samsung’s fear of an
inconsistent verdict never materialized. Regardless, Apple v. Samsung illustrates the concrete
costs imposed on courts and litigant alike. See Samsung’s Request, supra note 31, at 2 (“The
parties and the Court here have expended substantial time, money, and resources to bring this
case to verdict.”). Although some may see the costs of inconsistent verdicts as merely the costs
of doing “judicial business” that the court system should be willing to pay, whether this is sound
policy is beyond the scope of this Note.
232. See Driver, supra note 104, at 497 (noting the “unusual unanimity of opinion” among
lawyers, judges, and legal commentators who “have joined in condemning the general verdict”).
233. Friedland, supra note 115, at 199.
234. Id. at 200.
235. Indeed, the usefulness of any verdict sheet—much less a flowchart verdict sheet—
would be extinguished should the court decline to send the case to the jury on the basis of
complexity. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
236. Similarly, using flowchart verdict sheets for traditional general verdicts may not be as
beneficial because the risk of inconsistency is virtually nonexistent. See supra text accompanying
note 96.
237. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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238

across 5 different legal disciplines.” The case, and by extension the
verdict form, was so complex that Samsung, recognizing the
possibility of an inconsistent verdict “despite the jury’s best efforts,”
239
requested thirty minutes to review the verdict form. For cases of this
level of complexity, flowcharts alone may not be able to significantly
decrease the possibility of an inconsistency. Although not every case
may be as complex as Apple v. Samsung, cases featuring multiple
parties and multiple claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims may also
test the bounds of the flowchart verdict sheet’s effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the complexity argument does not imply that the
flowchart verdict sheet must be thrown out completely. To the
contrary, flowcharts may assist in juror comprehension and
decisionmaking even in simple cases, and at worst would have a
240
neutral effect on the case. Although very complex cases can indeed
test the bounds of the flowchart’s effectiveness, flowchart verdict
sheets may still assist jurors in reaching a valid verdict, especially
when combined with other approaches to improving juror
241
comprehension. Furthermore, because highly complex cases are the
ones that can cause confusion and inconsistent verdicts, those cases
are precisely the ones that would benefit most from flowchart verdict
242
sheets. To argue that flowchart verdict sheets should not be used at
all simply because they may not be completely effective on their own
ignores the benefits that they may provide—especially in these
complex cases.
B. “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It.”
Flowchart verdict sheets may be not widely implemented for the
same reason that other proposed jury innovations have not been

238. Samsung’s Request, supra note 31, at 1; Verdict Form, Apple, 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (No.
11-cv-1846).
239. Samsung’s Request, supra note 31, at 1. Although parties do certainly review verdict
forms, the extra step of filing a motion requesting time to review the verdict form seems much
more unusual, as does Samsung’s explicit acknowledgment of the possibility of inconsistency in
the verdict. See id. (“The likelihood of an inconsistent verdict is a possibility despite the jury’s
best efforts.”).
240. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part III.B.
242. For a case as complex as Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., supra notes 237–39, a
court may benefit from using multiple strategies in conjunction with flowchart verdict sheets,
such as bifurcating the trial. See Schwarzer, supra note 92, at 122–23 (suggesting that judges
identify and define which issues need to be tried to improve juror comprehension in complex
cases).
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adopted—as one judge writes, “[a]ttempts at innovation in the trial
process have traditionally been met with ritual cries of, ‘If it ain’t
243
broke, don’t fix it.’” Legal commentators have also recognized the
244
judicial inertia that results from longstanding legal traditions. A
similar argument is that flowchart verdict sheets have not been
implemented because of a fear of reversal on appeal. In other words,
despite the trial court’s discretion over the various aspects of the
verdict, flowchart verdict sheets may be regarded by courts of appeals
as too radical a departure from conventional verdict sheets to justify
245
their implementation at the trial level.
It is true that the use of flowchart verdict sheets raises
unavoidable questions related to their implementation, including who
should design the flowcharts, what they should look like, and as
described above, the boundaries of the flowchart verdict sheet’s
246
applicability. Although the exact contours of implementation have
yet to be worked out, several preliminary recommendations may
guide future discussions on implementation. The primary
recommendation of this Note is the creation of pattern flowchart
verdict sheets by the federal judiciary itself. These models may
assuage the fear of reversal on appeal that may hinder trial judges
247
from implementing flowchart verdict sheets. Like the creation of
pattern jury instructions, the creation of pattern flowchart verdict
sheets by appellate courts may have additional benefits such as (1)
obviating the need for judges and lawyers to spend time creating new
248
verdict sheets for each trial; (2) saving the time of appellate courts
on appeal; and (3) minimizing potential prejudice in the verdict sheets
against any particular litigant—all the while maintaining the legal
249
accuracy of the language and “uniformity in the treatment of cases.”

243. Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge’s Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury
Decisionmaking, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1990).
244. Id.; see, e.g., Driver, supra note 104, at 495 (recognizing the inertia that “tends to hold
courts and judges in the procedural grooves to which they are accustomed”).
245. Cf. Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 591 (citing literature finding that one reason
judges may not elaborate on or clarify jury instructions is fear of reversal).
246. See supra Part V.A.
247. See Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 590–91 (asserting that pattern jury instructions
are popular in part because they limit the number of appeals due to incorrect instructions);
Steele, et al., supra note 116, at 105 (suggesting that there may be a risk of reversal in using juryinstruction language not already approved by the appellate court).
248. See Lieberman et al., supra note 116, at 590 (noting the benefits of pattern jury
instructions).
249. Dattu, supra note 148, at 98.
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The language contained within the flowchart verdict sheet should
still, as much as possible, reflect the language of the judge’s verbal
250
instructions. To start, pattern flowchart verdict sheets could be
251
created for common types of claims, such as employment claims, or
for types of claims for which there are already widely used pattern
jury instructions. If the verdict sheets prove to be helpful, the
appellate courts could then create pattern verdict sheets for other
types of cases—including more complex types of cases—or different
forms of verdicts. Lastly, after finalizing the language and structure of
the pattern flowchart verdict sheet, the courts could enlist for the
actual design of the verdict sheets the help of “typographers,
calligraphers, graphic designers, illustrators, [and] artists,” all of
whom surely have been using these concepts of layering for a long
252
time.
CONCLUSION
The growing complexity of modern civil litigation implicates
several relevant concerns. Increases in the complexity of civil cases
may result in a higher number of inconsistent verdicts due to jury
error. Although courts have the discretion under Rule 49 to resubmit
an inconsistent verdict to the jury for further consideration or to
order a new trial, these ex post remedies may be expensive and time
consuming. At the same time, the general costs associated with a new
trial may be further exacerbated by complex cases, which often
involve voluminous discovery and multitudes of expert witnesses.
Furthermore, these remedies do not prevent the confusion and faulty
decisionmaking that may result in these inconsistent verdicts in the
first place.
The use of flowchart verdict sheets may, however, avoid these
costs by decreasing jury confusion and augmenting the
decisionmaking abilities of jurors. By leveraging psychological and
visual design principles to increase juror comprehension,
decisionmaking abilities, and spatial-analysis abilities, this Note
proposes preliminary steps in the implementation of these verdict
sheets, starting with the creation of pattern flowcharts. Although
flowchart verdict sheets may not completely resolve the problems

250. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Figure 1.
252. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION, supra note 170, at 65.

FANG IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

USING FLOWCHART VERDICT SHEETS

10/21/2014 6:07 PM

331

presented by inconsistent verdicts, this Note aims to canvass several
issues raised by inconsistent verdicts and guide the academic
discourse on the judicial development of visual verdict sheets in the
right direction.

